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Abstract
For various reasons, the cloud computing paradigm is unable to meet certain requirements (e.g. low latency
and jitter, context awareness, mobility support) that are crucial for several applications (e.g. vehicular
networks, augmented reality). To fulfil these requirements, various paradigms, such as fog computing,
mobile edge computing, and mobile cloud computing, have emerged in recent years. While these edge
paradigms share several features, most of the existing research is compartmentalised; no synergies have
been explored. This is especially true in the field of security, where most analyses focus only on one edge
paradigm, while ignoring the others. The main goal of this study is to holistically analyse the security
threats, challenges, and mechanisms inherent in all edge paradigms, while highlighting potential synergies
and venues of collaboration. In our results, we will show that all edge paradigms should consider the
advances in other paradigms.
Keywords: Security, Privacy, Cloud computing, Fog computing, Mobile edge computing, Mobile cloud
computing
1. Introduction
Cloud computing has taken the world by storm.
In this category of utility computing, a collection
of computing resources (e.g. network, servers, stor-
age) are pooled to serve multiple consumers, using
a multi-tenant model. These resources are avail-
able over a network, and accessed through standard
mechanisms [1]. The cloud computing paradigm
provides a variety of deployment models and service
models, from public clouds (organizations provide
cloud computing services to any customer) to pri-
vate clouds (organizations deploy their own private
cloud computing platform), and from Infrastruc-
ture as a Service models (IaaS, where fundamen-
tal computing resources are offered as a capability)
to Software as a Service models (SaaS, where ap-
plications are offered as a capability), among other
things. The benefits of cloud computing – mini-
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mal management effort, convenience, rapid elastic-
ity, pay per use, ubiquity – have given birth to a
multi-billion industry that is growing worldwide [2].
Despite its benefits, cloud computing is not a
panacea. Generally, public cloud vendors have
built a few large data centers in various parts of
the world. These large-scale, commodity-computer
data centers have enough computing resources to
serve a very large number of users. However,
this centralization of resources implies a large aver-
age separation between end user devices and their
clouds, which in turn increases the average network
latency and jitter [3]. Because of this physical dis-
tance, cloud services are not able to directly access
local contextual information, such as precise user
location, local network conditions, or even informa-
tion about users’ mobility behaviour. For various
delay-sensitive applications, such as vehicular net-
works and augmented reality, these requirements
(low latency and jitter, context awareness, mobility
support) are needed.
For these reasons, in recent years, various novel
paradigms have emerged, such as fog computing [4],
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Figure 1: Functional structure of edge paradigms
mobile edge computing [5], and mobile cloud com-
puting [6], among others (cf. [7, 8]). The com-
mon denominator in these edge paradigms is the
deployment of cloud computing-like capabilities at
the edge of the network. Most edge paradigms fol-
low the structure shown in Figure 1. Edge data
centers, which are owned and deployed by infras-
tructure providers, implement a multi-tenant vir-
tualization infrastructure. Any customer – from
third-party service providers to end users and the
infrastructure providers themselves – can make use
of these data centers’ services. In addition, while
edge data centers can act autonomously and coop-
erate with one another, they are not disconnected
from the traditional cloud. It is therefore possible
to create a hierarchical multi-tiered architecture, in-
terconnected by a network infrastructure. Besides,
we have to consider the potential existence of an un-
derlying infrastructure, or core infrastructure (e.g.
mobile core networks, centralized cloud services),
that provide various support mechanisms, such as
management platforms and user registration ser-
vices. Finally, one trust domain (i.e. edge infras-
tructure that is owned by a infrastructure provider)
can cooperate with other trust domains, creating an
open ecosystem where multitude of customers can
be served.
There are various differences among edge
paradigms, such as the focus on mobile network op-
erators as infrastructure providers in mobile edge
computing, the existence of user-owned edge data
centers (i.e. personal cloudlets) in mobile cloud
computing, and the use of different underlying pro-
tocols and interfaces, among others. Nonetheless,
there remain numerous similarities. Still, little of
the research in these fields takes into considera-
tion these similarities. Most architectures, proto-
cols, services, and mechanisms are designed with
only one edge paradigm in mind, and they do
not consider the state of the art of other edge
paradigms. At this initial stage, researchers should
consider that research findings in relation to one
edge paradigm might also be applied or adapted to
other edge paradigms.
This silo mentality is especially conspicuous in
the field of security. Although research on secu-
rity issues in edge paradigms is still nascent, given
the importance of this particular field, various re-
searchers have already identified various potential
threats. In the process, they have developed sev-
eral security and privacy mechanisms. However, as
mentioned, most research does not follow an inter-
disciplinary approach: studies tend to focus solely
on one particular edge paradigm and its state of the
art. Moreover, very few researchers have consid-
ered that it might be possible to analyse and adapt
other security mechanisms that were initially de-
signed for enabling technologies (e.g. wireless net-
works, distributed and peer-to-peer systems, virtu-
alization platforms [4]) and other related paradigms
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(e.g. cloud computing, grid computing).
Therefore, this study looks to provide, from a
holistic perspective, a detailed analysis of the secu-
rity of edge paradigms. This analysis will be orga-
nized as follows. Section 2 introduces the most im-
portant edge paradigms, including their history, use
cases, and standardization efforts. Section 3 analy-
ses the common features of, and differences among,
all edge paradigms, and highlights both their chal-
lenges and potential synergies. Section 4 introduces
the security issues that affect all edge paradigms;
this section analyses the various threat models that
target edge paradigms, alongside a brief overview
of the requirements and challenges of the security
mechanisms that should be used in this context.
Section 5 presents an analysis of the current state
of the art regarding security in edge paradigms.
This analysis does not merely enumerate existing
security mechanisms; it also points out synergies
among security mechanisms originally designed for
edge paradigms and other related fields. Finally,
conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Related Work. In recent years, various authors
have surveyed and reviewed the state of the art
of the security of various edge paradigms, such as
mobile cloud computing [9, 10, 11] and fog com-
puting [12, 13, 14]. Such works look to provide a
preliminary analysis of the threats that affect the
integrity of these paradigms, alongside an overview
of the security mechanisms by which to protect all
actors and infrastructures. Other works focused
on specific areas, such as network security [16] and
forensics [17] in fog computing. Moreover, certain
authors [15] have also provided an brief overview
of the basic features of all edge paradigms. How-
ever, as shown in table 1, this is the first study to
provide a detailed and up-to-date analysis of sev-
eral subjects from a holistic perspective, including
i) the common features, differences, and synergies
of edge paradigms, ii) a detailed analysis of the var-
ious threat models that target the integrity of all
edge paradigms, and iii) a thorough analysis of the
state of the art of security in all edge paradigms,
including potential synergies among security mech-
anisms.
2. Overview of Edge Paradigms
2.1. Fog Computing
The concept of Fog Computing was introduced by
Cisco Systems in 2012, and in its initial definition it
was considered as an “extension of the cloud com-
puting paradigm (that) provides computation, stor-
age, and networking services between end devices
and traditional cloud servers” [18]. Therefore, fog
computing does not cannibalize cloud computing,
but complements it: the fog architecture facilitates
the creation of a hierarchical infrastructure, where
the analysis of local information is performed at the
‘ground’, and the coordination and global analytics
are performed at the ‘cloud’. Here, cloud services
are deployed mostly at the edge of the network, but
they can also be deployed in other locations, such
as IP/multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) back-
bones. In fact, the fog network infrastructure is
heterogeneous, where high-speed links and wireless
access technologies will coexist [19].
The initial definition of fog computing was later
expanded and revised by various researchers (cf. [4,
20]). Although this extended definition is debat-
able, it reveals all the advances that the fog might
introduce. Under this new definition, fog comput-
ing does not become a mere extension of cloud
computing, but a paradigm of its own. The ele-
ments that implement the cloud services, the fog
nodes, can now range from resource-poor devices
(e.g. end devices, local servers) to more powerful
cloud servers (e.g. Internet routers, 5G base sta-
tions). Also, all these elements can also be able
to interact and cooperate with each other in a dis-
tributed fashion. This generates a three-tier archi-
tecture (Clients ⇔ fog nodes ⇔ Central Servers)
where centralized cloud servers coexist with fog
nodes but are not essential for the execution of fog
services [21]. Moreover, fog computing also pro-
vides support for the creation of federated infras-
tructures, where multiple organizations with their
own fog deployments can cooperate with each other.
Originally, fog computing was defined as a plat-
form that enabled the creation of new applications
and services in the context of the Internet of Things
(IoT). Examples of such services include hierarchi-
cal Big Data analytics systems and smart infras-
tructure management systems (e.g. wind farms,
traffic lights) [18, 4]. Yet, at present, there are sev-
eral studies that examined how this paradigm could
be used to implement other types of services: low-
latency augmented interfaces for constrained (mo-
bile) devices (e.g. brain-computer interfaces using
wireless electroencephalogram headsets [22], aug-
mented reality and real-time video analytics [23]),
cyber-physical systems [24], novel content deliv-
ery and caching approaches under the context of
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[9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] Our work
Features, Synergies No No No No No No Partial Yes
Fog - Threats No No No No Partial Partial No Yes
Fog - Security No No No Partial No 2015 No Q3 2016
MEC - Threats No No No No No No No Yes
MEC - Security No No No No No No No Q3 2016
MCC - Threats Partial Partial Partial No No No No Yes
MCC - Security 2013 2013 2015 No No No No Q3 2016
Table 1: Contribution of available surveys on Edge security
fog computing [25], and various vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) services
such as shared parking systems [26].
As of 2016, the efforts of creating a set of stan-
dardized open fog computing frameworks and ar-
chitectures have started (cf. Open Fog Consor-
tium [27]). These efforts do not need to start
from zero, as various researchers have already ana-
lyzed what a fog computing architecture could look
like. One example is the architecture defined by
Sang Chin et al. [28]. This context-aware infras-
tructure supports a diversity of edge technologies
(e.g. Wi-Fi, LTE, ZigBee, Bluetooth Smart), and
also supports network virtualization and traffic en-
gineering through Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN)
mechanisms. Other researchers have studied how
fog computing could be integrated with existing
IoT frameworks, such as OpenM2M [29]. In this
particular example, fog nodes are deployed at edge
devices such as road side units in vehicular net-
works, and implement various machine-to-machine
services such as lightweight M2M device manage-
ment systems and M2M sensor measurement frame-
works.
There are also various researchers that have al-
ready identified not only potential challenges, but
also forward-thinking deployments that make use
of the fog computing paradigm in novel ways. One
example is the need to provide an set of APIs that
will allow Virtual Machines (VM) to access to ser-
vices provided by fog nodes. Using these APIs,
VMs can access to local information such as net-
work statistics, sensor data, etc [30]. Another ex-
ample is the deployment of Airborne Fog Computing
systems – where flying devices such as drones act as
fog nodes and collaborate with each other and with
other servers in order to provide various services to
mobile users [31].
2.2. Mobile Edge Computing
The term Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) was
firstly used to describe the execution of services
at the edge of the network in 2013, when IBM
and Nokia Siemens Network introduced a platform
that could run applications within a mobile base
station [32]. This initial concept only had a lo-
cal scope, and didn’t consider other aspects such
as application migration, interoperability, and oth-
ers. MEC acquired its current meaning afterwards,
in 2014, when the ETSI launched the Industry
Specification Group (ISG) for Mobile-Edge Com-
puting [33]. Under this specification, MEC aims
to “provide an IT service environment and cloud-
computing capabilities at the edge of the mobile
network”. This group also pursues the creation
of an open ecosystem, where service providers can
deploy their applications across multi-vendor MEC
platforms. Once the standard is finished, telecom-
munication companies will be in charge of deploying
this service environment in their infrastructure.
The benefits of deploying cloud services at the
edge of mobile networks like 5G include low latency,
high bandwidth, and access to radio network infor-
mation and location awareness. Thanks to this, it
will be possible to optimize existing mobile infras-
tructure services, or even implement novel ones. An
example is the Mobile Edge Scheduler [34], which
minimizes the mean delay of general traffic flows
in the LTE downlink. Moreover, the deployment
of services will not be limited to mobile network
operators, but it will also be opened to 3rd party
service providers as well. Some of the expected
applications include augmented reality, intelligent
video acceleration, connected cars, and Internet of
Things gateways, amongst others [35].
In order to implement the MEC environment, it
is necessary to deploy virtualization servers (i.e.
MEC servers) at multiple locations at the edge
of the mobile network. Some deployment loca-
tions considered by the MEC ISG are LTE/5G
base stations (eNodeB), 3G Radio Network Con-
trollers (RNC), or multi-Radio Access Technology
(3G/LTE/WLAN) cell aggregation sites – which
can be located indoors or outdoors. Besides, the
MEC ISG has suggested that this virtualization in-
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frastructure should host not only MEC services, but
also other related services such as Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Net-
working (SDN) [35]. Such deployment would re-
duce the deployment costs, and provide a common
management and orchestration infrastructure for all
virtualized services.
As of 2016, the ETSI Mobile Edge Comput-
ing ISG [33] has produced a MEC framework and
reference architecture, whose functional elements
provide support to services such as application
execution, radio network information, and loca-
tion awareness. Besides, there are various studies
that are investigating how this service environment
could be deployed using both existing and novel
technologies. For example, Staring et al. [36] evalu-
ated three major open source cloud computing plat-
forms (OpenStack, Eucalyptus and OpenNebula),
and identified what modules need to be improved
in order to deploy the platforms in a mobile net-
work. Puente et al. [37] analyzed how small cell
clouds (clusters of interconnected eNodeB) could be
seamlessly integrated in existing LTE-A infrastruc-
tures without modifying any existing standards and
interfaces. Moreover, Maier and Rimal [38] studied
how fiber optic communication technologies could
be used to interconnect all the elements of a MEC
environment.
2.3. Mobile Cloud Computing
Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) mainly focuses
on the notion of ‘mobile delegation’: due to the
limited resources available to mobile devices, they
should delegate the storage of bulk data and the
execution of computationally intensive tasks to re-
mote entities. In the original MCC concept, in-
troduced in 2009, only centralized cloud comput-
ing platforms were considered as the most viable
solution to implement the remote execution of
tasks [39]. Later, other researchers expanded the
scope of MCC. In this new vision, tasks could also
be delegated to devices located at the edge of the
network [40]. At present, both visions of MCC co-
exist [41]. In this study, we will mostly focus on the
latter.
Initially, MCC sought to provide novel solutions
to services such as mobile learning, mobile health-
care, searching services, and others [42]. Nowadays,
many of these services can be implemented in a cen-
tralized cloud (e.g. voice-based search) or in the
mobile devices themselves (e.g. text-to-speech en-
gines). Nevertheless, the concept of MCC is still rel-
evant, as its potential has not been fully exploited.
There are certain applications, such as augmented
reality and augmented interface applications, where
the existence of an execution platform located at
the vicinity of the mobile devices can provide sev-
eral benefits such as lower latency and access to con-
text information. Moreover, as mobile devices are
equipped with functional units such as sensors and
high resolution cameras, it is possible to develop
novel crowdsourcing and collective sensing applica-
tions that make use of the location information [6].
One of the most active areas of research in the
field of MCC is the delegation of tasks to exter-
nal services [41]. There are various solutions that
allow applications to migrate part of their code
from the mobile devices to cloud-based comput-
ing resources located at the edge. Applications are
usually implemented using frameworks like .NET
and JVM, which makes the code migration pro-
cess easier. Some research results allow mobile de-
vices to migrate only part of their code, thus is
necessary to statically or dynamically identify the
code that needs to be offloaded. Other researchers
take a more extreme stance: an entire execution
environment (i.e. clone), representative of the mo-
bile device, is created. Then, part of the mobile
application (including memory image, CPU state,
and others) is loaded into the clone. Finally, some
approaches make use of mobile agents infrastruc-
tures, where the mobile device create a mobile agent
that will acquire/process information on its behalf.
There are even approaches, such as the concept of
Aqua Computing, that mix the notion of mobile
agents and clones [43].
Another important research area is the imple-
mentation of the cloud-based computing resources
located at the edge. There are two major strate-
gies: proximate immobile computing entities (fixed
virtualization servers), and proximate mobile com-
puting entities (ad-hoc conglomerate of mobile de-
vices) [44]. In this article we will focus mostly on
the first strategy, but will take into account various
aspects of the second strategy.
The core element of the first strategy is the
cloudlet. This concept, which was firstly defined
by Satyanarayanan et al. in 2009 [45], refers to a
small cloud infrastructure located near the mobile
users. This small infrastructure can be deployed
at business premises (e.g. coffee shops, company
buildings), uses persistent caching of data and code
instead of hard state, and allows devices to load
a small VM overlay over pre-existing full-fledged
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VM images [3]. There are already proofs-of-concept
freely available to the research community [46], in-
cluding user-centric personal cloudlets. Moreover,
several tests have shown that cloudlets improve the
response time and the energy consumption of mo-
bile devices (51% and up to 42%, respectively [47])
in comparison to centralized clouds.
There are various instances of the second strat-
egy. They all specify a distributed computing plat-
form on a cluster made of nearly devices, which
play the role of servers based on cloud computing
principles. The elements of the cluster can be mo-
bile devices (cf. Hyrax [48], FemtoClouds [49]), IoT
devices and entities (cf. Aura [50]), or a combina-
tion of several types of devices. Due to the limited
resources available to the devices that form the dis-
tributed cluster, this strategy does not make use of
virtualization techniques. Instead, some implemen-
tations make use of specific parallel algorithms such
as MapReduce, while others take a more general ap-
proach and allow various types of computationally
intensive tasks. In almost all cases, a controller is
in charge of receiving the tasks and discover what
devices could optimally execute them.
2.4. Other Approaches
As we have seen in the previous sections, there
are many paradigms that aim to bring cloud ser-
vices and resources closer to the users. Although
we have provided a summary of the most impor-
tant ones (cf. Fig. 2), there are still some minor
nascent architectures that are related to these ma-
jor paradigms. One example is the concept of the
superfluid cloud, defined by Manco et al. [7]. In
the vision of the superfluid cloud architecture, a
set of virtualization platforms with heterogeneous
capabilities (from microservers such as Raspberry
Pis to larger x86 deployments) are deployed at var-
ious points of the network: at the access network
level (e.g. 5G eNodeB), at the aggregation network
level (e.g. local data centers, network routers), and
at the core infrastructure level (e.g. cloud data
centers). Besides the deployment of heterogeneous
servers, another major differentiator of this archi-
tecture is the concept of massive consolidation: the
ability to execute a large number (around 10.000)
of minimalistic VMs in a single commodity server.
These VMs can be deployed and migrated to vari-
ous points of the network very quickly. This mas-
sively distributed, hierarchical architecture enables
the creation of on-the-fly services, which might be-
have as mobile agents if necessary.
Another architecture, known as edge-centric
computing, was defined by Garcia Lopez et al. [8].
In their vision, a federation of edge-centric dis-
tributed services, deployed across data centers and
nano data centers, collaborate with each other in
a peer-to-peer fashion. Moreover, the cloud can
take an auxiliary role, providing stable resources
when necessary. This vision enables the creation of
human-centered applications, such as the creation
of personal spaces at the edge (e.g. personal infor-
mation with access control and trust mechanisms
managed by the users), social spaces at the edge
(e.g. crowdsourcing applications based on user-
controlled social activities), and public spaces at
the edge (e.g. collaborative information flows where
multiple actors – human and city services – inter-
act).
3. Analysis of Features and Synergies
3.1. Features: Similarities and Differences
Table 2 summarizes the main properties of ev-
ery major edge paradigm. Some of these properties
were introduced in the previous section, while other
properties have been gathered from existing reports
and research documents (cf. [35, 37, 27, 21, 41, 42]
and others). Note that, for the sake of comparison,
this table also includes the properties of the existing
centralized cloud computing paradigm.
Similarities. When analyzing the properties of the
different paradigms, one apparent conclusion is that
these paradigms might come from different back-
grounds, but they all have the same basic goal:
to bring cloud computing-like capabilities to the
edge of the network. They all provide support for
some type of multi-tenant virtualization infrastruc-
ture (e.g. fog node, MEC server, cloudlet), which
is easily accessible through various broadband net-
works (e.g. fiber optic, wireless communications,
high-speed mobile networks). These infrastructures
can adjust the provisioning of capabilities to the lo-
cation and needs of their users, accessing nearby
computational resources (e.g. neighbour virtualiza-
tion pools, distributed mobile devices) if needed.
Besides, all paradigms take into consideration the
need to monitor the use of the different resources,
although the entities in charge of this monitoring
and the distribution of these entities varies from
paradigm to paradigm.
There are various similarities between all
paradigms, as well. One clear example is mobility:
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Figure 2: Simplified overview of major Edge paradigms
MEC Fog Computing MCC Cloud
Ownership Telco companies Private entities, Individuals Private entities
Deployment Network Edge Near-Edge, Edge Network Edge, Devices Network Core
Hardware Heterogeneous servers Servers, User devices Servers
Service Virtualization Virtualization, Others Virtualization
Net. Architecture N-Tier, Decentralized, Distributed Centralized
Mobility Yes N/A
Latency, Jitter Low Average
Local Awareness Yes N/A
Availability High
Scalability High Average
Table 2: Comparison of features of Edge paradigms
as most services are provided locally, it is essen-
tial to take into consideration the existence of mo-
bile devices. Every paradigm makes use of several
strategies to support user mobility: from mobility
management entities located at a higher level in
the network hierarchy, to mechanisms that provide
support for the migration of VMs. Another exam-
ple is the network architecture. All paradigms can
behave as an extension of the cloud, complement-
ing its services, which enables the creation of a hi-
erarchical multi-tiered architecture. On the other
hand, the elements of these paradigms can also be-
have in a decentralized and distributed way; edge
data centers can provide services and take decisions
autonomously, and also collaborate with each other
without completely depending on a central infras-
tructure. Moreover, all paradigms pursue the cre-
ation of federated infrastructures, where multiple
edge infrastructures can coexist and exchange in-
formation and services.
These paradigms also provide a similar set of ben-
efits, which are derived mostly from the proxim-
ity of the edge data centers. For example, when-
ever users access to the computing capabilities of
their surroundings, both the network latency and
the packet delay variation (jitter) are low and pre-
dictable. Another benefit is the ability to access to
local information (e.g. network conditions, physical
aspects of the environment, geographical location),
which allows all users and services to be aware of
their local context. A further benefit is the scalabil-
ity of the whole ecosystem. There are various rea-
sons for this. First, nodes can be wide-spread and
geographically available in large numbers. Second,
it is assumed that the nodes located at a certain
site will mostly provide services to local devices.
Note that it can be possible to make use of neigh-
bouring nodes, or even use nodes situated at more
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remote geographical locations or at a higher level in
the hierarchy, if the situation requires it. Finally,
another important benefit is the high availability
of the services. There are two reasons for this: i)
node redundancy at a local level, and ii) in certain
paradigms (e.g. MEC), the edge data centers are
actually hosted by the communication infrastruc-
ture (e.g. mobile network infrastructure).
Differences. Obviously, even if all these paradigms
have the same goal, they will have some underlying
differences on how they want to fulfill that goal.
For example, MEC limits the deployment of edge
computing platforms to mobile network infrastruc-
tures such as 5G. On the other hand, fog nodes can
also be deployed at other locations, such as user-
managed servers, access points, routers, gateways,
etc. As for MCC, it has an even more distributed
scope, where in some instances the devices them-
selves can participate in the service provisioning
process. This difference on the deployment and
management of the edge data centers influences
over who can become a service provider. For ex-
ample, in MEC, only telecommunication operators
can become MEC providers, as they own the mobile
network infrastructure where the edge data centers
are deployed. In contrast, any user (from compa-
nies to tech-savvy end users) can deploy their own
fog and MCC nodes, effectively becoming part of
the service provisioning ecosystem – or even creat-
ing their own private cloud-like environments.
Another difference, related to the previous point,
is the deployment of curated applications. As MEC
servers are controlled by telecommunication opera-
tors and hosted in their infrastructure, it is possi-
ble for third-party service providers to work closely
with the operators and develop MEC-specific ser-
vices. Such services can then be extensively tested
and possibly integrated in a customised way. This
is also true for fog computing, as certain fog nodes
can be deployed in ISP infrastructures (e.g. routers
and gateways). Finally, some paradigms, such as
MCC, provide some specific services that are not
considered by other paradigms. For example, MCC
provides support for distributed execution mecha-
nisms that are not related to virtualization, such
as the execution of the MapReduce parallel algo-
rithm over constrained devices. Another example
is the edge-centric computing vision, which focus
on personal spaces (e.g. user-controlled personal
networks) and peer-to-peer interactions.
3.2. Challenges and Synergies
Due to the similarities between all edge
paradigms, they have several major challenges in
common, which are summarized in Table 3 (cf. [20,
6, 35] and others). The common denominator of
most of these challenges is the decentralized and
distributed nature of these paradigms, in contrast
with the centralized nature of the cloud comput-
ing paradigm. The decentralization and proxim-
ity of the service infrastructure to the edge brings
various benefits (e.g. low latency, scalability), but
it also brings new issues that must be carefully
considered. Examples of such issues are the mo-
bility of the various entities (including the service
infrastructure itself [31]) and the need to synchro-
nize ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ states within a multi-tiered
architecture. The distributed nature of the ser-
vice infrastructure, where several edge data cen-
ters that might be owned by different infrastructure
providers should be able to collaborate with each
other, imposes other challenges as well. It is nec-
essary to develop standards that specify how the
different elements of the architecture can collabo-
rate with each other, and also how the VMs can
access certain information (e.g. context and host
information) regardless of their deployment place.
Precisely, regarding virtualization, it is essential to
provide support for an optimized VM lifecycle –
where their creation, deployment, and migration is
as lightweight as possible. Moreover, as resources
are distributed over various entities and locations,
there must exist a set of mechanisms that enable
the discovery and orchestration of such resources,
including their monitorization.
While all paradigms share these common chal-
lenges, it still is necessary to consider the nuances
of every paradigm (e.g. the features of their un-
derlying protocols, their specific use cases) when
researching and developing novel solutions. In fact,
due to technical, economic and political reasons, it
is clear that multiple standards and specifications
will coexist, with their own solutions to existing
problems. Yet, even if there are several structural
differences between the paradigms, it does not mean
that they should exist in a vacuum, ignoring the
advances in other related fields. Due to the sim-
ilarities between the paradigms (cf. Section 3.1),
it is safe to assume that there will be mechanisms
and platforms that can provide a generic solution
to a shared problem. Such solutions can then be
adapted to other edge paradigms. In fact, this as-
sumption is supported by the existing state of the
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Challenge Description
Infrastructure Interoperability; Monitoring; Accountability
Virtualization VM lifecycle; Container and context awareness
Resources & Tasks Resource location; Task scheduling; Offloading
Distribution Cooperation; N-tier management; ‘Soft state’
Mobility Connectivity; Seamless handoff
Programmability Usability; Session management
Table 3: Common challenges in Edge paradigms
art, where there are already various mechanisms
that have been developed with a certain paradigm
in mind, but that can be applied to other paradigms
as well. We will provide various instances of such
synergies in the following paragraphs.
One area where clear synergies between
paradigms can be found is the management
of VMs. There are already various works, in the
areas of fog computing [51] and MEC [52], that
define and solve optimization problems whose goal
is to improve the distribution of VMs over a set
of local clusters, minimizing the utilization of re-
sources. These mechanisms also define when VMs
need to replicate, migrate and be merged. As the
underlying assumptions made by these algorithms
mainly demand a decentralized infrastructure able
to access local information, they can be adapted
to any edge paradigm. Another important aspect
is the cost of setting up and deploying new VMs.
Precisely, the advances in areas such as the super-
fluid cloud [7], where thousands of minimalistic
VMs can be deployed in a commodity server with
minimal latency, can be adapted and used in other
paradigms as well.
Another area of research whose solutions might
be applied to other paradigms is resource offloading,
which is one of the most studied areas in the field of
MCC. As mentioned in Section 2.3, there are var-
ious strategies that allow user devices to delegate
their tasks to external servers (remote procedure
call frameworks, code migration, clone deployment,
mobile agents). Yet there are situations where not
an user device, but a VM might want to delegate
part of its tasks. Instances of such situations are
user mobility (e.g. specific tasks – not the whole
VM – are migrated to the closest node to the user),
task optimization (e.g. network intensive tasks are
kept at a local level, and computationally intensive
tasks are sent to a more capable cloud system [53]),
user empowerment (e.g. the creation of user spaces
in the network through clones in aqua comput-
ing [43]), and others. Many delegation strategies
only require the existence of a virtualization plat-
form where tasks can be delegated [6], thus a lot of
research on this particular area can be adapted to
satisfy the needs of applications deployed in other
edge paradigms.
Other examples include user mobility, context
awareness and location of resources. There are var-
ious algorithms, such as [54, 55], that try to predict
the location of (potential) users in order to deploy
expected resources in advance. The core algorithms
that implement the migration plan only require
a distributed architecture of computing platforms
that are able to communicate with each other with
as less latency as possible. As for context aware-
ness, several works in this area analyze how local
hardware awareness can help VMs to understand
the limits of their own containers [30], or how VMs
can make use of hardware acceleration technolo-
gies such as graphic computing units [56]. These
works are essential in a context where virtualization
servers are heterogeneous, and VMs might need to
dynamically adjust their behaviour. About the lo-
cation of resources, there have been various works
in the area of pervasive computing (cf. [57]) that
could be applied to fog, MEC, and other paradigms.
Many of these search engines make use of a N-tiered
hierarchy, where the lowest layer of the hierarchy
stores information about the local contexts. Algo-
rithms such as Bloom filters are then used to repre-
sent a set of keywords in order to reduce the com-
munication overhead.
There are also several application scenarios that
have been defined for only one paradigm, but due to
their requirements (e.g. support for decentralized
and distributed execution platforms) they could be
implemented in other related paradigms as well.
Scenarios that have been defined mostly for fog
computing, such as IoT node pairing services [58],
context-aware data analytics platforms [59], and
emergency notification mechanisms [60] could also
be deployed in MEC and cloudlet infrastructures.
Lastly, there are various supporting services that,
even if they have been developed with a single
paradigm on mind, they can be adapted to other
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paradigms. The network store concept, developed
by Nikaein et al. [61] is one of such supporting ser-
vices. This research work introduces a digital dis-
tribution platform for MEC, which provides Vir-
tualized Network Functions (VNFs), or slices, that
enable 5G application use-cases. Although these
slices cannot be directly deployed in other related
paradigms due to the differences in the underly-
ing protocols, the concept of a digital distribu-
tion platform and its architectural elements (service
and business layer, slice orchestrator and manager
layer) can be adapted and deployed in other virtual-
ization platforms. Precisely, due to the distributed
and collaborative nature of edge paradigms, the im-
plementation of a network store can serve as a cat-
alyst for the rapid deployment of edge applications,
as it can behave as a repository of functionality and
knowledge.
As a final note, we want to emphasize that, even
if every paradigm pursues the creation of their own
standards and their own service infrastructure, this
doesn’t mean that it is not possible for them to col-
laborate with each other – or even being integrated
with each other. For example, cloudlets are tradi-
tionally associated to MCC, but they can become
a technology enabler for both fog computing and
MEC. Also, as both fog computing and MEC aim
to provide support for federated services and inter-
actions with different providers (e.g. through a set
of open APIs), it can be possible to create appli-
cations that make use of both edge paradigms, or
even deploy middleware platforms that will connect
various edge paradigms at an infrastructure level.
4. Security Threats
There are several challenges that must be over-
come in order to create an ecosystem where all
actors (end users, service providers, infrastructure
providers) benefit from the services provided by
edge paradigms. Not surprisingly, one of the great-
est challenges is security. In this section, we will
a) review why security is a very important factor
in this particular context (section 4.1), b) analyze
the specific threats that can target edge paradigms
(section 4.2), and c) introduce the requirements and
challenges of the security mechanisms that should
be applied to this particular context (section 4.3).
4.1. The Importance of Security in Edge Paradigms
As aforementioned, one of the greatest challenges
for the creation of a edge paradigm ecosystem is se-
curity. There are several reasons for this. First, at
the core of most edge paradigms, there are several
enabling technologies such as wireless networks, dis-
tributed and peer-to-peer systems, and virtualiza-
tion platforms [4]. It is then necessary not only to
protect all these building blocks, but also to orches-
trate the diverse security mechanisms. This is by it-
self a complex issue, as we need to create an unified
and transversal view of all the security mechanisms
that allows their integration and interoperability.
Second, the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts: by assuring the security of all the enabling
technologies, we do not assure the security of the
whole system. Once cloud computing-like capabil-
ities are brought to the edge of the network, novel
situations arise (e.g. collaboration between hetero-
geneous edge data centers, migrating services at a
local and global scale) whose security has not been
widely studied. Besides, we also need to consider
the specific requirements of this particular context
(cf. Section 3.1), which might affect the kind of
security mechanisms that could be deployed. For
example, the security mechanisms should be as au-
tonomous as possible and not depend on the con-
tinuous existence of a centralized infrastructure.
There are two main reasons for this: not only there
will be situations (e.g. malicious attacks, intermit-
tent connectivity, distributed applications) where
no centralized control system is available, but it is
also necessary to take into account the latency of
the security mechanisms. Another example is the
technological limitations of the elements of the in-
frastructure. For example, certain edge data cen-
ters might be composed of microservers (e.g. Rasp-
berry Pi) that lack the hardware protection mech-
anisms of commodity servers [7], or include legacy
edge devices with limited connectivity – which re-
stricts the authentication protocols that can be de-
ployed [12]. Moreover, the security mechanisms
need to consider the existence of mobile devices,
which can make use of the edge data centers any-
time and anywhere.
Third, we need to keep in mind that, in addi-
tion to the security threats that will appear due to
the specific features of edge paradigms, the whole
system also inherits the security threats that are
present in their building blocks and in the applica-
tion scenarios. And this is no trivial issue, because
these threats are, in fact, very significant. A clear
example of this is the Internet of Things, which is
the main raison d’etre of fog computing [18] – and
a major use case in all edge paradigms. It is also
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considered as a combination of “the worst-of-all-
worlds” in terms of security: not only we need to
combine and protect multiple layers of technologies
(from network to mobile to cloud [62]), but also
provide global connectivity and accessibility in a
heterogeneous ecosystem [63]. This situation gen-
erates a considerable attack surface, that in turn
also affects all paradigms that make use of the IoT.
Finally, the impact than a successful attack might
cause in our society is quite considerable. The num-
ber of application scenarios where edge paradigms
can be applied is huge. In fact, almost any aspect
of our daily lives can be influenced by applications
deployed in these infrastructures: Our private in-
formation (e.g. photos, medical reports), our daily
routines (e.g. transportation, shopping), our enter-
prise ecosystems (e.g. industries, supply chains),
our critical infrastructures (e.g. energy, emergency
systems), etc. Without proper security and privacy
mechanisms, the benefits of edge paradigms will be
quickly overshadowed by the damage caused by ma-
licious adversaries.
4.2. Threat landscape
Once we have understood the importance of se-
curity in the context of edge paradigms, it is time to
analyze what are the specific threats that can tar-
get these paradigms, and the extend of the damage
they can cause. In the near future, this analysis will
help us in the development of security mechanisms
that can adequately protect the whole ecosystem
against such threats. Besides, it will also allow us
to understand what are the particularities of every
edge paradigm, as they have subtle differences that
will affect the implementation and deployment of
the security mechanisms.
However, before analyzing the threats, it is nec-
essary to examine how the lack of a global perime-
ter affects the security of edge paradigms. As we
have seen in previous sections, even in the most
closed paradigm – mobile edge computing – the
whole ecosystem will not be controlled by one single
owner. Even more, edge data centers are capable
of providing services without continuously depend-
ing on a central infrastructure. Therefore, all rel-
evant assets, including the network infrastructure,
the service infrastructure (e.g. edge data centers,
core infrastructure), the virtualization infrastruc-
ture, and the user devices, are controlled not by
a single entity but by various actors (including,
in some cases, end users) who need to cooperate
with each other. A consequence of this situation
is that every element of the infrastructure can be
targeted or subverted at any moment. In fact, this
“anything, anytime” principle is also inherited from
some of the underlying building blocks and applica-
tion scenarios, such as the Internet of Things [63].
Having said that, the “anywhere” principle (at-
tacks can be performed from anywhere) does not
fully apply to this particular context. The cause of
this is the geographical location of the edge data
centers. One of the basic tenets of these paradigms
is that cloud computing capabilities are basically
provided in close proximity to end users. As a
result, a edge data center (e.g. fog nodes, MEC
servers) will provide services mostly to local enti-
ties (e.g. mobile users located at the vicinity, enti-
ties inside a building). There are a few exceptions
to this rule, such as virtual machines that act like
agents and migrate to other infrastructures away
from their physical counterpart, or specific local ser-
vices that are requested by remote entities. This
particularity of edge paradigms is a double-edged
sword: on the one hand, it limits the impact of an
attack to the local environment. On the other hand,
if one adversary can control one edge data center,
it might be able to control almost all the services
that are provided in that geographical location.
There is another consequence of the lack of a
global perimeter: the nature of the different at-
tacker profiles that will target edge paradigms.
Even if traditional ‘external’ attackers will exist
(i.e. adversaries that do not control any element
of the whole infrastructure), there will exist many
adversaries that will control one or more elements of
the infrastructure: user devices, virtual machines,
servers, sections of the network, even whole edge
data centers. This situation is similar to the cur-
rent Internet, where malicious adversaries can take
control of existing elements or deploy their own.
These adversaries are both ‘internal’ and ‘external’,
as they control one part of the infrastructure but
not the others. Note that these attackers can still
try to influence other healthy sections of the in-
frastructure. Examples are the injection of bogus
information during a collaboration process, or the
deployment of malicious virtual machines that, like
viruses, will try to exploit vulnerabilities in their
hosts. Needless to say, traditional ‘internal’ attack-
ers (i.e. undercover adversaries such as disgruntled
employees that are officially allowed to access cer-
tain elements of part of an infrastructure) will also
exist within this ecosystem.
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Asset Threats
Network infrastructure Denial of service, man-in-the-middle, rogue gateway
Edge data center
Physical damage, privacy leakage, privilege escalation,
service manipulation, rogue data center
Core infrastructures Privacy leakage, service manipulation, rogue infrastructure
Virtualization
infrastructure
Denial of service, misuse of resources, privacy leakage,
privilege escalation, VM manipulation
User devices Injection of information, service manipulation
Table 4: Categorization of threats in Edge paradigms
4.2.1. Threat Model
After reviewing the nature and scope of the po-
tential attackers, we can finally provide an analysis
of the threats. For this analysis, we will enumerate
the most important assets of edge paradigms, and
then summarize the attacks that can be launched
against such assets. Note that some of the threats
that affect edge paradigms will be the same threats
that affect traditional data centers, as both of them
share various assets (e.g. server farms, networking
infrastructure). Still, in our analyses we need to
consider the specific decentralized and distributed
nature of edge paradigms, plus the existence of ad-
ditional services such as interoperability and mobil-
ity support, location awareness, and others. There-
fore, not only the impact of certain common threats
will be different (e.g. an attack to an edge data cen-
ter will mostly impact the services related to that
geographical area), but also novel threats will arise.
A summary of this threat classification can be
found in table 4. Note that this classification will
be defined in a way that it can be applied to all
edge paradigms – we will explicitly explain the par-
ticularities of every major paradigm afterwards, in
Section 4.2.2.
Network Infrastructure. As aforementioned, edge
paradigms make use of various communication net-
works to interconnect their elements: from wireless
networks to mobile core networks and the Internet.
An adversary can try to target any of these com-
munication infrastructures.
• Denial of Service (DoS). All communication
networks are vulnerable to several DoS attacks,
such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks and wireless jamming. Yet the scope
of these attacks is limited. Attacks against the
edge networks will only disrupt the vicinity of
the affected networks. Also, an attack to the
core infrastructure might not completely dis-
rupt the functionality of the edge data centers,
as their protocols and services can be designed
to work in an autonomous or semi-autonomous
way.
• Man in the the Middle. Malicious adver-
saries can be able to take control of a sec-
tion of the network, and then launch attacks
such as eavesdropping and/or traffic injection.
The practicality of this particular threat was
demonstrated by Stojmenovic et al. [12]. In
this particular case, a gateway that intercon-
nected two 3G and WLAN networks was com-
promised, and the adversary gained access to
the network interfaces. This attack is not only
very stealthy but also very dangerous, as it
can affect all the elements (e.g. information,
virtual machines) that traverse that particular
node.
• Rogue Gateway. The open nature of several
edge paradigms, where even user-owned de-
vices can become full-fledged participants (e.g.
personal cloudlets, mobile devices participat-
ing in a cluster of nearby devices), create a sce-
nario where malicious adversaries can deploy
their own gateway devices. This particular
threat produces the same outcome as the Man-
in-the-Middle attack (e.g. the ability to eaves-
drop and/or inject traffic), even if the means
are different (compromising versus deploying).
Service Infrastructure: Edge data center. The edge
data center hosts the virtualization servers and sev-
eral management services, amongst others. How-
ever, for an external adversary, the attack surface of
a edge data center is quite considerable: from mul-
tiple public APIs that provide services to all actors
(e.g. users, virtual machines, other data centers) to
other access points such as web applications. Note
that the specific threats related to the virtualization
infrastructure will be described later.
• Physical damage. In certain paradigms, the el-
ements of the service infrastructure might not
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be guarded or protected against physical dam-
age. Clear examples are fog nodes managed
by small businesses and user devices forming
clusters. For this particular threat, it is nec-
essary for the attacker to be in the vicinity of
the device in order to destroy it. As a result,
there is a very high probability that this kind of
attack will be witnessed by various observers.
Moreover, the impact of this particular attack
is limited to a local scope: only the services as-
sociated to a particular geographical location
will be disabled.
• Privacy leakage. Both internal adversaries and
honest but curious adversaries can try to access
the flow of information that traverse the edge
data center. Nevertheless, the scope of these
attacks is limited: An edge data center mainly
stores and processes information from the en-
tities that are located at its vicinity, although
in some cases (e.g. distributed storage ser-
vices, migrating virtual machines) it can deal
with data coming from other locations. Note,
however, that these edge data centers might
be able to extract more sensitive information
about a user thanks to their awareness of the
context [14].
• Privilege escalation. The considerable attack
surface of these edge data centers allows exter-
nal adversaries to try to take control of vari-
ous of its services. This is facilitated by the
fact that edge data centers can be managed
by professionals with limited security training,
or even hobbyists. These infrastructures might
be misconfigured, or even lack proper mainte-
nance. Note that this attack can also be per-
formed by internal adversaries that abuse of
their privileges and take advantage of their in-
sider knowledge.
• Service manipulation. Once an adversary has
gained control of certain sections of the edge
data center, either by privilege escalation or
by abusing his own privilege as a legitimate
administrator, it can manipulate the services
of the data center. As a result, the adversary
can launch several types of attacks, such as se-
lective denial of service attacks and selective
information tampering, amongst others.
• Rogue data center. In this threat, an adver-
sary is able to control an entire edge data cen-
ter through various means, such as privilege
escalation or deploying his own malicious in-
frastructure. This creates a very dangerous
scenario, as the adversary i) has complete con-
trol of all the services that are provided in a
geographical location, ii) has access to all in-
formation flows that are directed to the rogue
data center, and iii) can manipulate all inter-
actions with external systems (e.g. migrating
virtual machines, service requests from remote
entities).
Service Infrastructure: Core infrastructures. All
edge paradigms can be supported by several core in-
frastructures, such as mobile core management sys-
tems and centralized cloud services. It is then nec-
essary to analyze what are the specific threats that
target these upper layers in this particular context.
It should be noted that, in certain paradigms (e.g.
MEC), the core infrastructure will be managed by
the same companies (e.g. mobile network opera-
tors) that deploy the edge data centers. Besides,
we should not assume that all interactions with a
cloud provider can be completely trusted, due to
cyber-crimes [64] and other reasons (e.g. govern-
ment intrusion [65]). A complete taxonomy of gen-
eral threats that target cloud providers is available
elsewhere [66].
• Privacy leakage. There are no guarantees that
all information flows that are processed and
stored in the upper layers of our edge infras-
tructures will not be accessed by unautho-
rized entities or honest but curious adversaries.
Note, however, that these internal adversaries
might not have access to the whole information
set, including raw measurements. The reason
is simple: as the lower layers, the edge data
centers, will process the local information, it is
probable that the upper layers will only receive
a subset of said information. In addition, edge
paradigms allow edge data centers to exchange
information directly with each other, bypass-
ing the central systems.
• Service manipulation. An internal adversary
with enough privileges can try not only to ma-
nipulate the information flow, but also to in-
stantiate rogue services that will provide bo-
gus information (e.g. fake management infor-
mation, historic data) to other partners. But
this particular threat follows the same princi-
ple as the privacy leakage threat: these inter-
nal adversaries will not be able to influence the
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whole ecosystem, due to the decentralized and
distributed nature of edge paradigms.
• Rogue infrastructure. This threat assumes that
certain elements of the core infrastructure can
be targeted by specialized adversaries. Such
attacks will be able to take control of some ser-
vices of the upper layers of the infrastructure,
causing havock on the whole ecosystem. Al-
though the chances of an adversary successfully
launching this attack are extremely low, it is
still necessary to have this scenario in mind for
especially sensitive situations, where special-
ized security and fault tolerance mechanisms
need to be deployed.
Virtualization Infrastructure. Within the core of
all edge data centers, we can find a virtualization in-
frastructure, which enables the deployment of cloud
services at the network edge. Like all other assets,
this infrastructure can be exploited in several ways.
Besides, we also need to consider that the virtual
machines themselves might be controlled by mali-
cious adversaries who are trying to misuse or exploit
the resources available to them.
• Denial of Service (DoS). A malicious virtual
machine can try to deplete the resources (in-
cluding computational, network and storage
resources) of the host where it is running. This
threat is quite significant for this particular
context, as most edge data centers will not
have the resources that are available to other
cloud infrastructures.
• Misuse of resources. A malicious virtual ma-
chine can execute various malicious programs
that do not target the edge data center where
it is hosted, but other local or remote entities.
For example, a malicious virtual machine can
search for vulnerable IoT devices in the local
environment. It can also execute programs for
cracking passwords, or host botnet servers.
• Privacy leakage. Due to requirements in their
design, most virtualization infrastructures lo-
cated at edge data centers are not completely
transparent: they can actually implement var-
ious APIs that provide information about the
physical and logical environment, such as the
state of the local network. However, if these
APIs are not protected, a malicious virtual ma-
chine can be able to obtain sensitive informa-
tion about the execution environment and the
surroundings of the edge data center.
• Privilege escalation. Malicious virtual ma-
chines can also try to take advantage of vul-
nerabilities in their hosts. There are various
outcomes of this attack: from isolation failures,
where the malicious VM succeeds at manipu-
lating other VMs, to escalation of privileges,
where the malicious VM takes control of cer-
tain elements of the host. This problem is ex-
acerbated by the fact that virtual machines can
migrate from one data center to the other due
to various reasons (e.g. users moving from one
location to the other, virtual machines acting
as agents).
• VM manipulation. A host system that is being
controlled by an adversary (e.g. a malicious in-
sider with enough privileges, a VM that has es-
calated privileges), can launch several attacks
to the VMs that are running inside it. These
attacks can range from the extraction of infor-
mation to the manipulation of the computa-
tional tasks are being executed within the VM.
Moreover, the adversary can also infect the VM
with logic bombs, malware or other malicious
elements that will compromise the security of
other data centers once the VM migrates to
other physical locations.
User devices. The devices controlled by the users
are also important elements of the whole ecosys-
tem. They not only consume services, but also can
become active participants that provide data and
participate in the distributed infrastructure at var-
ious levels. However, there will be also rogue users
that might try to disrupt the services in one way
or another. Note, however, that the scope of these
threats is quite limited: in this context, users can
only influence their immediate surroundings.
• Injection of information. Any device that
is controlled by an adversary can be repro-
grammed to distribute fake information when
queried (e.g. vehicles reporting wrong values,
users providing fake data to crowdsourcing ser-
vices). Note that a device might also provide
bogus values due to an anomaly in their sensors
or internal systems.
• Service manipulation. There are some cases
where a device might participate in the provi-
sioning of services. For example, a cluster of
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devices controlled by a virtual machine located
at an edge data center can act as a distributed
computing platform. Yet if an adversary gains
control of one of these devices, it can be able
to manipulate the outcome of the service.
4.2.2. Differences Between Paradigms
In this section, we will make use of the features
defined in Section 3 to analyze how the threats pre-
sented in the previous section affect all paradigms.
One feature that has a noticeable effect on the im-
pact of the previous threats is the ownership of
the infrastructure. In some paradigms, such as mo-
bile edge computing, one single company (the mobile
network operator) controls not only various edge
data centers located at different geographical loca-
tions, but also part of the core networks that are
connected to those data centers (i.e. the mobile
network infrastructure). In principle, this infras-
tructure is well maintained, with a consistent secu-
rity policy and guarded against physical and virtual
intruders. Thanks to this, the attack surface should
be smaller, which decreases the chances of an ad-
versary destroying or gaining control of part of the
service infrastructure. Other paradigms, such as fog
computing and mobile cloud computing, allow small
companies (e.g. stores) to deploy their own edge
data centers, or even allow users to become active
participants in the provisioning of services. This
creates a more heterogeneous ecosystem, which will
probably be less protected than the infrastructures
deployed by big companies due to various reasons
(e.g. deficient maintenance, limited physical pro-
tection).
However, having a large segment of the service
infrastructure managed by one single company has
its drawbacks, too. One clear example is the im-
pact of a successful attack. Once an adversary has
taken control of a section of the infrastructure, he
becomes an internal attacker within that infrastruc-
ture. If the necessary contingency mechanisms are
not in place, he might try to gain more privileges
and/or exploit further vulnerabilities in order to
gain even more influence. Moreover, if an insider
adversary takes control of certain elements of the
core network of that company, it can be able to
manipulate large sections of the whole ecosystem.
On the other hand, if an adversary takes control of
an edge data center managed by a small company
or a tech-savvy individual, his reach will be limited
to the scope of that particular edge data center.
Another feature that has some influence on the
security threats is the hardware used to imple-
ment the cloud services in the edge data centers.
Paradigms such as mobile cloud computing and con-
cepts such as the Superfluid Cloud can make use of
microservers (Raspberry Pi) and user devices (mo-
bile phones) to provide their services. At present,
it is still necessary to analyze how the hardware ex-
tensions of certain microcontrollers can be used to
guarantee a secure virtualization environment [67].
Regarding the hardware used in paradigms such as
fog computing, the commodity servers used in small-
scale deployments can make use of the same security
mechanisms as the commodity servers used in cloud
deployments [68]. Note, however, that some small-
scale deployments might lack experienced staff, and
as a result there will be some processes (e.g. defini-
tion of security policies, separation of roles, storage
of logs in separate physical storage) that might not
be properly implemented or maintained.
Regarding the deployment of the elements of
the infrastructure, we have already mentioned that
certain instances of the mobile cloud computing
paradigm allows the creation of clusters of devices
at the very edge of the network, and that these clus-
ters provide services through mechanisms such as
parallelization. Because of this, the MCC paradigm
has his own extra set of security challenges [10],
such as the impact of malware in the user devices,
the identification and authentication of the different
peers, and the existence of DoS attacks that target
honest participants. Besides, we need to mention
one aspect that is strongly linked to the network
architecture. All paradigms support the creation
of a hierarchical multi-tiered architecture, where
different elements (user devices, edge data centers,
core infrastructures) have different roles. As such,
certain security services (e.g. authentication, mon-
itorization) can be deployed in a more centralized
or a more distributed way. Every approach has its
own advantages and disadvantages. For example,
if a centralized service is rendered unavailable or is
controlled by an adversary, the whole infrastructure
will collapse unless contingency mechanisms are in
place. Finally, we also need to consider that certain
paradigms will make use of their own protocols
and services, such as the Small Cell as a Service
(SCaaS) elements in MEC environments, which will
have their own security requirements (cf. [69]).
4.3. Security Mechanisms
In order to create an effective layer of defense
against the different threats, it is crucial to deploy
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various types of security services and mechanisms.
In this section, we will introduce the security ser-
vices and mechanisms that should be integrated in
all edge paradigms, alongside with a brief overview
of their requirements and challenges in this partic-
ular context. Note that all security mechanisms
need to take into account various common require-
ments and constraints, such as reducing the latency
of their operations as much as possible, supporting
mobile devices and other mobile entities (e.g. vir-
tual machines), achieving technical, functional, and
semantic interoperability, managing the limitations
of existing technologies, and providing support for
disconnected operations.
Identity and Authentication. In all edge paradigms,
there are multiple actors (end users, service
providers, infrastructure providers), services (vir-
tual machines, containers), and infrastructures
(user devices, edge data centers, core infrastruc-
tures) interacting in an ecosystem where multiple
trust domains coexist. This situation brings nu-
merous challenges, as not only we need to assign an
identity to every entity, but also we need to allow all
entities to mutually authenticate each other. With-
out these security mechanisms, it would be very
easy for external adversaries to target the resources
of the service infrastructure with impunity. More-
over, internal adversaries would not leave a trail of
evidence behind their malicious acts.
In this context, it is necessary to explore identity
federation mechanisms and inter-realm authentica-
tion systems, which should be interoperable with
each other. Besides, due to various requirements
(latency, availability of a central server), it is also
desirable that an entity can provide a proof of its
identity without contacting a central server (e.g.
presenting valid and trusted attributes). Note,
however, that in some cases parts of the infrastruc-
ture can be managed by end-users (e.g. personal
cloudlets), and even interact in a peer-to-peer fash-
ion. Therefore, we should study the applicability of
distributed authentication mechanisms.
Access Control Systems. The existence of an autho-
rization infrastructure is equally important for edge
paradigms, as it is essential to check the credentials
of the various entities in order to authorize their
requests to perform certain actions (e.g. service
providers deploying virtual machines, virtual ma-
chines accessing edge data center APIs, edge data
centers interacting with each other). If there are no
authorization mechanisms in place, anyone with-
out proper credentials can misuse the resources of
the virtualization infrastructure. Users would be
able to impersonate administrators and control the
services of the infrastructure. Malicious attackers
would be able to access any resources, including
proprietary and/or personal information. The pos-
sibilities would be limitless.
Due to the inherent features of edge paradigms, it
is crucial to deploy an authorization infrastructure
in every trust domain, so as to allow the owners
of such domains to disseminate, store and enforce
their own security policies. Such infrastructures
should be able, in principle, to process the creden-
tials of any entity if there is a trust relationship
between them. Moreover, it should be also possi-
ble to take into account various factors, such as the
geographical location and the resource ownership,
in the definition of the authentication policies. For
example, migrating virtual machines might be al-
lowed to use additional resources from the virtual-
ization infrastructure if they hold certain privileges
(e.g. owned by local law enforcement agencies).
Protocol and Network Security. If the network in-
frastructure is not protected, the whole service
ecosystem will be threatened by internal and ex-
ternal malicious adversaries. It is then necessary
to protect the myriad of communication technolo-
gies and protocols that are used by edge paradigms.
For example, there are various wireless communica-
tion technologies (e.g. Wi-Fi, 802.15.4, 5G, Sigfox,
LoRa) that might be used to serve local customers.
Therefore, edge data centers and their administra-
tors need to understand and make use of the secu-
rity protocols and extensions implemented by such
technologies. Also, edge paradigms need to con-
figure and integrate the security protocols that are
used by the core infrastructures (e.g. public Inter-
net, mobile network infrastructure). Moreover, we
need to provide network isolation among tenants in
the virtualization infrastructure, among other pro-
tection mechanisms.
Here, there are various challenges that need to
be addressed. For starters, it is necessary to ade-
quately configure the different elements of the net-
work infrastructure. Yet all these elements will be
deployed in different geographical locations, which
will be managed by different administrators. Be-
sides, there will situations where entities that be-
long to different trust domains (e.g. edge data cen-
ters from different infrastructure owners) will in-
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teract with each other. In this very heterogeneous
scenario, we need to establish a secure connection
between entities that might even use different com-
munication technologies. There are other aspects
that are just as important, such as achieving a dy-
namic balance between the strength of the security
mechanisms and the overall quality of service of the
network.
Trust Management. Another security mechanism
that is of great importance for edge paradigms is
trust. In this context, the concept of trust goes be-
yond the idea of “not knowing who I am interact-
ing with”, which is mostly solved by implementing
authentication mechanisms and establishing trust
relationships between trust domains. The reason
is simple: we also have to deal with the concept
of uncertainty, or “not knowing how my partner is
going to behave”. All entities have a variety of col-
laborating peers at their disposal: users can have
various service providers available in their vicinity,
service providers can choose from many infrastruc-
ture providers, and so on. However, such peers
might not meet our expectations: the service la-
tency might be high, the anomaly detection rate
might be low, or the data might be inaccurate.
There are even worse situations: peers might be-
have egoistically or maliciously.
It is then necessary to seriously consider the de-
ployment of trust management infrastructures in
this context. The benefits are numerous: from im-
proving the decision-making processes of all enti-
ties (e.g. migrate high priority virtual machines to
nearer edge data centers with higher reputation), to
enhancing the management of personal data (e.g.
reduce the granularity of the information that is
transmitted to low reputation entities), amongst
others. There are many challenges, though. All
trust management infrastructures should be able to
exchange compatible trust information with each
other, even if located at different trust domains.
Another problem lies with the storage and dissemi-
nation of trust information, as it should be accessi-
ble anywhere, anytime, with as less latency as pos-
sible. Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of the
infrastructures, non-malicious entities might find
themselves with a low reputation due to temporary
reasons, thus it is necessary to find a balance be-
tween punishment and redemption.
Intrusion Detection Systems. Talking about mali-
cious entities, we have already seen in Section 4.2.1
that external and internal adversaries can attack
any entity at any time. Without proper intrusion
detection and prevention mechanisms, any success-
ful attacks will go undetected, slowly undermining
the functionality of the whole infrastructure. It is
then necessary to ensure that the whole infrastruc-
ture is covered by such defense mechanisms. Fortu-
nately, we also have seen that the “anywhere” prin-
ciple does not completely apply to these paradigms:
the impact of most attacks is usually limited to a
local environment. Therefore, local infrastructures,
such as edge data centers, can be in charge of moni-
toring all their elements – network connections, vir-
tual machines, etc – and their surroundings. Be-
sides, these local infrastructures can also cooperate
with each other or with core infrastructures located
at a higher level in the network hierarchy. This way,
it can be possible to detect attacks that target large
sections of the service infrastructure.
However, the challenges of running an intercon-
nected network of detection and prevention mech-
anisms in a heterogeneous, decentralized and dis-
tributed infrastructure are numerous. The spe-
cific attacks that can be launched against edge
paradigms need to be understood. If a database
of attacks is used (e.g. for signature-based IDS),
it needs to be updated and protected at all times.
A balance between local and global defense mecha-
nisms needs to be achieved, and a global monitor-
ing infrastructure that encompasses multiple layers
and/or trust domains needs to be developed. More-
over, all defense mechanisms, regardless of their lo-
cation, must be able to exchange information with
each other in an interoperable format. Such infor-
mation should be permanently available in order to
detect more persistent threats. Finally, the defense
mechanisms must behave as autonomously as pos-
sible, in order to reduce the maintenance overhead
and improve the usability of the security infrastruc-
ture.
Privacy. Besides malicious adversaries, it is also
possible to find honest but curious adversaries.
These adversaries are usually authorized entities
(e.g. edge data centers, infrastructure providers)
whose secondary goal is to know more about the
entities that make use of their services. This knowl-
edge can then be used in various ways: usage pro-
filing, location tracking, disclosure of sensitive in-
formation, etc. All these adversaries represent a
threat to the privacy of users. Unfortunately, all
edge paradigms are open ecosystems, where multi-
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ple trust domains are controlled by different infras-
tructure owners. In such a context, it is not possible
to know in advance if a certain service provider is
trustworthy enough to respect the users’ privacy.
Therefore, this is a very serious threat that must
be carefully considered.
There are various challenges in this area. First,
personal data will be stored and processed by enti-
ties that are outside the control of the users. There-
fore, it is essential to provide users with various effi-
cient mechanisms that not only protect their infor-
mation, but also allow users to query it and process
it (e.g. auditable data, controlled disclosure). Sec-
ond, it is necessary to achieve a balance between
anonymity and responsibility. In this dynamic en-
vironment, users have the right to protect their
identity and their personal data, but also have the
responsibility to behave honestly. If a user misbe-
haves, it should be possible to use some mechanisms
to identify the malicious party. Finally, we need
to consider that human mobility is, in fact, quite
predictable (cf. [70]): we usually go to the same
places, follow the same routine every day. As a re-
sult, users will probably make use of the same edge
data centers over and over. This poses a challenge
to the development of privacy mechanisms that aim
to protect the users’ location and service usage.
Virtualization. The virtualization infrastructure is
one of the core elements of edge paradigms, thus it
is essential to protect it by designing and deploying
security mechanisms in all edge data centers. With-
out these mechanisms, not only malicious insiders
can take control of virtual machines deployed by
users, but also malicious virtual machines can ma-
nipulate the services of edge data centers. There
are numerous countermeasures that can be imple-
mented in all commodity servers, such as isolation
policies, hypervisor hardening, separation of roles
and VMs, networking abstractions, and many oth-
ers [68]. Note, however, that any mechanisms that
depend on the restriction of physical access might
be difficult to implement in this context.
Fault tolerance and resilience. No paradigm is ever
going to be 100% secure and immune from threats,
and edge paradigms are no exception. Miscon-
figurations, vulnerabilities, outdated software, and
other weaknesses will allow malicious adversaries
to disable or take control of certain elements of the
whole infrastructure. It is then necessary to inte-
grate various mechanisms and strategies (e.g. re-
dundant operations, failover capabilities, disaster
recovery mechanisms) that will allow the service
infrastructure to continue its intended operation.
However, the deployment of the edge data centers
at the edge of the network is a double-edged sword.
On the one hand, protection mechanisms can take
advantage of the fact that various infrastructure
providers might be available at the same location.
On the other hand, as services are provided at a
local level, there might be situations where no re-
placement is available.
Forensics. As we have already mentioned, no mat-
ter what protection mechanisms are put in place,
edge paradigms will be successfully attacked. These
attacks will leave certain evidence behind, which
can be used to reveal information about the at-
tacker and his methods. The goal of forensics is
to identify, recover, and preserve this evidence, so
it can be presented in court. The management of
evidence in edge paradigms is a very complex is-
sue, mainly due to the existence of multiple actors,
infrastructures, technologies, and scenarios. Never-
theless, it might be possible to make use of existing
research in related areas, such as cloud forensics
(cf. [71, 72, 73]), to solve certain issues such as mo-
bile forensics, virtualization forensics, and storage
forensics.
Besides, Wang et al. [17] and Zawoad et al. [74]
have provided a detailed analysis of the main re-
quirements of fog computing forensics and mo-
bile cloud computing forensics, respectively. Both
works agree that there are various common chal-
lenges in this area, such as i) storing trusted evi-
dence in a distributed ecosystem with multiple trust
domains, ii) respecting the privacy of other ten-
ants when acquiring and managing evidence, and
iii) preserving the chain of custody of the evidence.
Then again, both works agree that edge data cen-
ters should need less computational resources to
manage potential evidence: due to their geographi-
cal location and their local scope, they do not man-
age as many resources (e.g. network traffic, virtual
machines) as centralized cloud infrastructures.
5. Security Challenges and Opportunities
In the previous sections, we have reviewed
the similarities and differences between all edge
paradigms, and we have provided a detailed analy-
sis on the threats that can target these paradigms
– and the security mechanisms that should be used
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to protect them. In this section we will provide
an analysis of the state of the art regarding secu-
rity in all edge paradigms (section 5.1), and we
will conclude such analysis with a discussion on
existing shortcomings and potential research areas
(section 5.2). As with Section 3.2, we will point
out in our analysis potential synergies between all
edge paradigms. Note, however, that we will also
consider in our analysis other related paradigms
(e.g. cloud computing, grid computing, peer-to-
peer computing) and some of the enabling technolo-
gies that are used by edge paradigms (e.g. wireless
networks, distributed and peer-to-peer systems, vir-
tualization platforms [4]).
There are several reasons for this. Some of the
underlying assumptions of the security mechanisms
that were designed for related paradigms do not
conflict with the requirements of edge paradigms.
For example, certain peer-to-peer security mecha-
nisms only require a decentralized infrastructure of
peers that can communicate with each other. Other
security protocols are independent of the underly-
ing technologies that implement them, thus they
can be easily adapted to other environments. More-
over, some security mechanisms were designed with
a specific scenario in mind, but their functional ele-
ments can easily be mapped to edge paradigm sce-
narios. For example, the security components of
certain trust management systems for grid com-
puting only assume that servers hosted at differ-
ent administrative domains can exchange trust in-
formation securely. These building blocks can be
mapped to a edge paradigm scenario where multi-
ple edge data centers that belong to different trust
domains exchange information in a secure way. It is
obvious that all these security mechanisms should
not be adapted without an extensive analysis, yet
they can prove that researchers do not need to start
from scratch when designing security mechanisms
for edge paradigms.
5.1. Specific challenges and promising solutions
5.1.1. Identity and Authentication
At present, there are no research works that ana-
lyze how to identify and authenticate the members
of a world-wide infrastructure of interconnected
edge data centers owned by different companies and
individuals. Yet it might be possible to look for
the solution to this problem in other related fields,
such as federated cloud computing and peer-to-peer
computing. In fact, there are multiple approaches
that pursue the creation of inter-cloud identity
management systems [75]. Such approaches make
use of various standards, like SAML and OpenID,
in order to provide Single-Sign On (SSO) authenti-
cation between clouds. As for peer-to-peer comput-
ing, there are also several mechanisms that provide
mutual authentication without having to connect
to a central authentication server [76]. As the de-
sign of these approaches is compatible with the un-
derlying infrastructures of edge paradigms, all these
approaches might be adapted to handle the authen-
tication of edge data centers that belong to different
trust domains.
On the other hand, there are some authentica-
tion infrastructures, which focus on user authen-
tication within the same trust domain, explicitly
designed for edge paradigms. For example, Donald
et al. [77] defined a centralized infrastructure for
MCC where a single trusted third party serves as
the authentication server. However, this approach
requires the authentication server to be accessible
at all times, thus their applicability is limited. In
another work, Ibrahim [78] developed a user au-
thentication system that allows any fog user and
fog node to mutually authenticate each other, yet
this approach forces all fog nodes to store certain
credential information of all the users of the trust
domain. There are other works in the areas of
MCC [79] and fog computing [12] that are able
to authenticate users, even if the authentication
server is not reachable, with less overhead. This
is achieved by using pairing cryptosystems and se-
cure hardware [79], or by using hybrid encryption
(public-key and symmetric-key encryption) [12].
Although these mechanisms focus on user authen-
tication, they might be useful for authenticating a
federation of edge data centers that belong to the
same trust domain.
Precisely, on the subject of user authentication,
as edge data centers are located in the vicinity of
end-users, researchers have proposed various au-
thentication schemes that make use of location-
specific information. For example, in the con-
text of federated mobile cloud computing, Shouhuai
et al. [80] introduced the concept of situational
authentication, which is based on notions such
as “whom you are with”, “where you are”, and
“what time is it”. Other authors, such as Bouze-
frane [81], use Near Field Communication (NFC)
to verify that a mobile device is offloading tasks to
an authorized local cloudlet. Note that the notion
of location-based authentication has been already
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studied in several other fields (e.g. wireless sensor
networks [82], Internet of Things [83]), providing
various mechanisms that could be adapted to edge
paradigms.
As for user mobility, there have been some pro-
tocols that have tried to implement a secure and
efficient handover authentication in MCC scenar-
ios. For example, Yang et al. [84] provided an effi-
cient design that allowed a mobile client to migrate
from one region to another. Note that these proto-
cols usually need to access an authentication server
in a centralized cloud infrastructure, thus there is
room for improvement. Finally, note that certain
edge paradigms allow users to deploy their own
personal data centers. Consequently, some works,
such as the OPENi framework [85], have studied
how to grant access to external users in such per-
sonal cloudlet platforms. In OPENi, the authenti-
cation component makes use of the OpenID Con-
nect authentication layer, amongst other mecha-
nisms. Therefore, the owner of the cloudlet de-
cides which authentication servers he trusts, and
what users are allowed to access the resources of
the cloudlet.
5.1.2. Access Control Systems
There are very few studies that have investi-
gated the development of fine-grained access control
mechanisms in the context of edge paradigms. One
example is the OPENi framework [85], which was
mentioned in the previous section. In this frame-
work, the authorization is based on OAuth 2.0, and
the owner of the cloudlet defines the access rights
of every resource by creating and storing access
control lists (ACL) in a NoSQL database. This
approach is more suitable for personal cloudlets,
where their owners can define what operations can
be performed on a resource by a certain user. Other
approaches, like the one introduced by Huang et
al. [86] and used by Stojmenovic et al. [12], use
cryptographic primitives such as attribute-based
encryption (ABE) to implement attribute-based ac-
cess control policies. In this approach, users are
provided with certain attributes, and access con-
trol rules connect such attributes with the opera-
tions that can be performed on a resource. This
mechanism can be appropriate for a single trust
domain, where service providers can use these at-
tributes (alongside with their credentials) to get
permission to deploy VMs in an edge data center.
Other authors have explored the deployment of
policy enforcement components and the manage-
ment of security policies. One simple example can
be found in the architecture defined by Vassilakis
et al. [87], which made use of a formal method-
ology to deploy security components in MEC small
cells. These components provide protection and ac-
cess control to various MEC services, such as radio
resources and virtualization services. However, one
of the most prominent examples is the policy man-
agement framework for fog computing designed by
Dsouza et al. [88]. In this framework, the orches-
tration layer of the fog architecture is supported by
a policy management module, which defines vari-
ous components – including a repository of rules,
an attribute database, and a session administrator.
Moreover, the policies can be enforced at various
levels, such as edge data centers, VM instances,
and IoT devices. This policy management frame-
work does not have any special architectural re-
quirements beyond the existence of a core infras-
tructure, thus it can be applied to other paradigms
such as mobile edge computing.
As for the existence of federated and dis-
tributed access control architectures in other re-
lated paradigms, there is actually an extensive lit-
erature on this subject [89, 90]. Several of these
mechanisms might be adapted to our context in or-
der to solve existing open issues. For example, Al-
mutairi et al. [91] developed a distributed access
control architecture for multicloud environments,
based on role-based access control (RBAC) poli-
cies, that also provided inter-domain role mapping
and constraint verification. This approach might
be used to connect various entities that belong to
different trust domains. Besides, there are other
security mechanisms that, although not created for
edge paradigms, might be suitable for certain sce-
narios. For example, the Direct Anonymous At-
testation with Attributes (DAA-A) protocols allow
anonymous users to prove that they possess a cer-
tain set of trusted attributes. These protocols can
be implemented using the primitives defined in the
Trusted Platform Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0) specifi-
cation [92], thus they can be applied to scenarios
where two edge data centers need to prove that they
have certain attributes (e.g. location, capabilities)
without disclosing their owners.
5.1.3. Protocol and Network Security
All the communication technologies that are used
by edge paradigms are either mature standards
(e.g. TCP/IP stack, Wi-Fi) or are being exten-
sively studied by both industry and academia (e.g.
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5G, Sigfox). They define their own security pro-
tocols and mechanisms, which are able to provide
privacy and data integrity between two authenti-
cated entities. One of the challenges in this area
is the distribution of the credentials that will be
used to negotiate the session keys. Yet solutions
are available, even if more research is needed. For
example, a designated certification authority con-
trolled by one infrastructure provider can distribute
credentials to all the elements located within his
trust domain. Cryptographic attributes, such as
the attributes used in [86], can also be used as cre-
dentials in order to exchange session keys [93]. Be-
sides, there are several works in various areas, such
as federated content networks [94], that define how
multiple trust domains can negotiate and maintain
the interdomain credentials that will be used to es-
tablish secure channels. The requirements of these
solutions are not very restrictive, thus they might
be applied to edge paradigm environments.
Another aspect that we have to take into account
is the security of the virtualized network infrastruc-
ture; that is, the network infrastructure that is used
by the VMs deployed at edge data centers. As al-
ready pointed out by Ahmad et al. in their detailed
analysis of the subject [95], both software defined
networking (SDN) and network function virtualiza-
tion (NFV) can be extremely useful in the context
of edge paradigms. These approaches can be used
in various ways, such as isolating different types of
traffic even under adversarial conditions, isolating
unsecure network devices, directing the traffic to-
wards security devices, reconfiguring the systems
in real time, etc. Notice that the original goal of
NFV and SDN is to simplify the management of
the network, by virtualizing the router functions
and by implementing programmable network con-
trol and operation logic. These services are also
beneficial for edge paradigms, as one of the chal-
lenges that need to be solved is the management of
the network infrastructure [96, 97]. Note, however,
that both SDN and NFV have their own security
challenges that need to be addressed [95, 98].
5.1.4. Trust Management
Although trust is one of the most important secu-
rity requirements in edge paradigms, the amount of
research that has been conducted in this area as of
2016 is quite limited. Actually, most of the research
has focused only on the area of mobile cloud com-
puting, analyzing the trust relationships between
users. For example, Petri et al. [99] studied how
various nodes could create a trustworthy peer-to-
peer cloud, where feedback aggregation was used
to identify egoist users. Also, Chen et al. [100] an-
alyzed how call patterns can be used to derive the
trust relationships between human users. One of
the only works that explicitly analyzed how to cal-
culate the reputation of edge data centers was de-
veloped by Hussain et al. [101]. In this work, the
researchers describe the implementation of a cen-
tralized trust manager, which stores the reputation
of LTE-deployed cloudlets. Using this system, users
can rate the services of cloudlets anonymously.
Trust management has been a very active area of
research in many other related fields [102, 103, 104].
Therefore, as with the other security properties, re-
searchers might benefit from studying and adapting
existing trust management systems. There are, in
fact, several systems that might be applicable to
edge paradigms, due to their focus on decentral-
ized deployments and cross-domain relationships.
One example is the self-managed trust management
system by Kantert et al. [105]. In this work, au-
tonomous servers from different administrative do-
mains share their resources in a grid-like scenario.
In contrast to other grid deployments, it is assumed
that egoist or malicious servers will exist. There-
fore, it is necessary to calculate a set of trust metrics
in an autonomous and distributed way. This work
might be used as a foundation for calculating trust
values between edge data centers.
Another example is the quantitative trust man-
agement component, defined by Figueroa et al. and
integrated into the Safety On Untrusted Network
Devices (SOUND) platform [106]. This platform is
comprised by several communities of trust, which
contains various hosts. Whenever two hosts from
different communities interact, they take into ac-
count not only their mutual trust, but also the trust
between their communities, and the trust between
the community and the other host. Due to the sim-
ilarities between the communities of trust and the
edge trusted domains, the design of this particular
component might be used as an input for the de-
sign of trust management systems deployed in edge
data centers. Finally, Bennani et al. [107] defined
a Bayesian network-based trust model for hybrid
cloud computing environments. In this scenario, a
private cloud can assess and track the reputation
of various services provided by public clouds. This
kind of approach might be used to track the rep-
utation of services that are available to the whole
ecosystem, such as Security-as-a-Service solutions.
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5.1.5. Intrusion Detection Systems
Most of the research on the area of intrusion de-
tection and prevention systems has focused on mo-
bile cloud computing, with only a few exceptions
such as the active honeypot system designed by
Mtibaa et al [108] that focused on detecting lo-
cal adversaries in mobile edge computing deploy-
ments. Yet some of these MCC-centric research
works might be used for other paradigms, too. Gai
et al. [109] proposed a framework where mobile de-
vices using 5G networks could delegate their intru-
sion detection tasks to centralized services located
in the cloud. While this research was focused on
centralized cloud services, it might be possible to
adapt this framework to a more distributed ap-
proach, where the IDS services will be deployed
in nearly located edge data centers. Such services
will then have a comprehensive view of the state of
their surroundings. Also, Shi et al. [110] presented
a distributed IDS deployed in a cloudlet mesh ar-
chitecture. In this architecture, the members of the
cloudlet can collaborate with each other and with
external entities in order to detect malware, mali-
cious attacks, and others. This type of collaborative
IDS might also be used by a federation of edge data
centers to monitor the traffic of a certain geograph-
ical location.
Although there is still work to be done, it is per-
fectly possible to reuse various IDS mechanisms and
solutions developed for cloud computing [111] and
other related paradigms. The reason is simple. The
main task of edge data centers is to provide cloud
computing capabilities to users. Therefore, edge
data centers can benefit from IDS that monitor the
behaviour of VMs, the internal network and their
surroundings. The main challenge here is to deal
with the distributed nature of the whole infrastruc-
ture, where multiple trust domains coexist. Yet
many IDS solutions do not need of centralized in-
frastructures – they can monitor their environment
autonomously. One example is the CROW solu-
tion, developed by Pitropakis et al. [112]. This IDS
solution makes use of the computational power of
GPU cards to effectively monitor the health of each
VMs, detecting both attacks against the infrastruc-
ture and the presence of malicious insiders. Other
examples are the IDS solutions that rely on software
based networking (SDN) principles, and provide
services such as deep packet inspection, network re-
configuration, policy management, and flow-based
anomaly detection, amongst others (cf. [95]).
Moreover, there are actually various IDS frame-
works whose goal is to interconnect and monitor
different trust domains. Elements of these frame-
works might be reused or adapted to our context.
For example, Luo et al. [113] introduced a secu-
rity architecture for federated cloud environments
that facilitates the early detection of cyberattacks
and the deployment of early warning systems such
as honeypots. Instances of this architecture need to
be deployed in the centralized command and control
center of every trust domain, thus its applicability
to a N-tiered hierarchy needs to be further studied.
Yet the architecture also introduces various mech-
anisms that allow multiple trust domains to coor-
dinate in-cloud and cross-cloud defense activities.
Finally, some studies, like [114], have provided an
analysis of attacks that specifically target federated
cloud environments – and that can also target edge
paradigms.
5.1.6. Privacy
In the field of edge paradigms, privacy is one
area that has been particularly active in the last
years. In fact, many of the security protocols pre-
sented in the previous sections (e.g. entity authen-
tication [79] and authorization [12, 92], trust man-
agement [101]) allow users to interact with edge
data centers and other entities in an anonymous
way. Besides, there is a multitude of data pri-
vacy mechanisms specifically developed for the mo-
bile cloud computing paradigm. These mechanisms
tackle several challenges such as enforcing privacy
policies when migrating code and data amongst col-
laborating mobile devices [115], and concealing the
location of a set of clients that are located in the
same geographical area by means of establishing a
peer-to-peer network [116]. These mechanisms are
designed for a collaborative cloud of local devices,
yet they only require that all devices are intercon-
nected and know their physical location. Therefore,
they might also provide some inputs on the design
of future privacy mechanisms for collaborative edge
data centers. Note that there are other mecha-
nisms, such as the software-defined pseudonym sys-
tem for vehicular networks developed by Huang et
al. [117], that make full use of the concept of inter-
connected local cloudlets.
Moreover, privacy has been one of the most re-
searched fields in cloud computing [118]. There are
various cloud computing processes that have been
enhanced with privacy features, such as protecting
VMs during their storage and execution, and mi-
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grating VMs from one data center to another [119].
Most of these solutions do not need a centralized
infrastructure, and only require of a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM), thus they can be implemented
in the commodity servers that are available in edge
data centers. Moreover, there are specific privacy
mechanisms, such as data encryption, secure data
sharing, encrypted data search, integrity verifica-
tion, and many others [120], whose main goal is to
protect the personal data of users. Some of these
mechanisms do not have high computational re-
quirements, thus they can be implemented in the
user devices that interact with the edge data cen-
ters.
Notice that there are some use cases (e.g. per-
sonal cloudlets, corporate environments) where
there is a trust relationship between the users and
the edge data centers located at their vicinity. In
such cases, it is possible to deploy privacy helper
entities in the edge data centers. These entities
will act as a front-end for the users, and can im-
plement various data privacy mechanisms. These
mechanisms can be used to control the quality and
granularity of the personal information that is re-
ceived by service providers or other remote entities
(cf. [121, 122]). In addition, the privacy helpers can
implement other privacy services, such as protect-
ing the users’ identities from other remote services
by creating pseudonyms and/or concealing their ad-
dresses (cf. [11]). Finally, it should be noted that
the edge paradigms themselves can actually be used
to strengthen the privacy features of certain ser-
vices, such as crowdsourcing. For example, Abdo et
al. [123] demonstrated that, by deploying a crowd-
sourcing platform in a trusted edge data center, it
was possible to protect the anonymity of the par-
ticipants of certain location-based services.
5.1.7. Virtualization
In the context of cloud computing, the security
of virtualization infrastructures is a field that has
been intensively studied in recent years [124]. For-
tunately, many secure virtualization mechanisms do
not need centralized managers or specific hardware
unavailable to commodity servers. Therefore, they
can be applied to the virtualization infrastructures
that are used in edge paradigms. One clear example
is the notion of Virtual Trusted Platform Modules
(vTPM) [125]. By virtualizing Trusted Platform
Modules (TPM), vTPMs are able to provide TPM
services (e.g. secure storage, cryptographic func-
tions) to any virtual machine that is running on top
of a hypervisor. In fact, existing hypervisor plat-
forms, such as Xen and Hyper-V, already provide
support for vTPMs. These services have been used
to implement various security services that are rel-
evant to edge paradigms, such as VM creation and
cloning [126], VM migration [127], platform attes-
tation [128], and many others (data storage, secure
rollbacks).
Besides, in the area of mobile cloud computing,
there are some research studies that propose se-
cure computation offloading solutions. For exam-
ple, Hao et al. [129] proposed a system that allows
a subset of a mobile application to securely run in a
cloud server. Also, Dhanya et al. [130] proposed a
secure partitioning mechanism that kept the most
sensitive or vulnerable parts of an application in the
mobile device. These solutions might be adapted
to other edge paradigms, as there might be some
cases where a VM only needs to send a small agent
to other data centers (cf. [131]).
5.2. Summary
Table 5 provides a summary of the state of the art
that was reviewed in the previous section. In this
table, all studies are classified according to the orig-
inal paradigm for which they were designed. One
obvious conclusion is that there are very few studies
that have been specifically designed for fog com-
puting and mobile edge computing, compared to
the amount of studies that have been focused on
mobile cloud computing. The reasons are simple:
i) these paradigms were created very recently, and
their infrastructure has not been fully defined, and
ii) the mobile cloud computing paradigm has been
studied longer. The reader should note, however,
that many studies in the area of mobile cloud com-
puting have not targeted the security of edge data
centres (i.e. cloudlets), but distributed clusters of
mobile devices instead.
Even if the number of studies that target edge
paradigms is quite limited, it does not mean that
researchers must start from zero when developing
new security mechanisms. As we have seen in the
last section, it might be possible to use the security
mechanisms and components that have been de-
signed for other related paradigms as a foundation
for the development of novel edge security mecha-
nisms. Moreover, we also have shown in the most
recent section that it might possible to reuse or
adapt various security mechanisms that were specif-
ically designed for one edge paradigm to the other
edge paradigms. However, it is necessary to analyse
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Fog Computing MEC MCC Other paradigms
Identity and Authentication [12][78] —
[77][79][80]
[81][84][85]
[75][76][82]
[83]
Access Control Systems [86][12][88] [87] [85]
[89][90][91]
[92]
Protocol and Network Security — — —
[86][93][94]
[95][96][97]
Trust Management — — [99][100][101]
[102][103][104]
[105][106][107]
Intrusion Detection Systems — [108] [109][110]
[112][95][113]
[114]
Privacy [12] —
[79][101][115]
[116][121][11]
[123][117]
[92][118][119]
[120][122]
Virtualization — — [129][130][131] [124]
Forensics [17] — [74] [132]
Table 5: State of the art in Edge security as of Q1 2016
how the specific nuances of every edge paradigm -
like underlying features of mobile network operator
infrastructures or user-owned edge data centres -
will affect this adaptation process.
Having said this, several issues will need to be
studied and evaluated in the near future. Some ex-
amples of these issues are explained here briefly. It
is necessary to investigate the impact that certain
attacks, such as denial of service, rogue data centres
and malicious VMs, will have on the service infras-
tructure. In addition, it must be assessed how such
attacks can be detected and neutralised by intrusion
detection/prevention systems. The edge paradigm
ecosystem must provide support for various iden-
tity management frameworks, including those used
by prominent application scenarios like the Internet
of Things. It must be possible for administrators to
maintain a consistent network configuration and ac-
cess control policy across all elements of the edge
infrastructure with as little overhead as possible.
Besides, we need to analyse how trust management
systems can benefit other security mechanisms as
well as the exact impact that edge paradigms will
have on the privacy of their users. It is essential
to reduce the latency of all security mechanisms as
much as possible, and to study the security of mo-
bile entities in this context.
Furthermore, there are certain research areas
that have been neglected in the context of edge
paradigms, such as secure software engineering, se-
curity and usability, fault tolerance and resilience,
and forensics. All of them are essential in this
context. By considering the specific features of
edge paradigms (e.g. context awareness or inter-
action with mobile clients) during the development
of security-aware software systems, the vulnerabili-
ties specific to our context will be greatly reduced.
Usability is another essential factor, as the develop-
ment of usable security mechanisms will limit mis-
configurations and facilitate the maintenance of the
whole ecosystem. Thanks to fault tolerance, the
service infrastructure will be able to continue its
operation, even if at a reduced level. Last, mali-
cious adversaries can be identified and prosecuted
if effective forensics procedures are in place.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we have analysed from a holis-
tic perspective the security threats and challenges
that affect edge paradigms, such as fog computing,
mobile edge computing, and mobile cloud comput-
ing. In the first part of our analysis, we identified
the features and problems that are common to all
edge paradigms. In the second part, we provided
a novel analysis of the multiple threats that target
all edge paradigms, alongside a detailed study re-
garding the state of the art of security mechanisms
that should be integrated into all edge paradigms.
As a conclusion of this analysis, we have shown
that research should not be compartmentalised, but
all edge paradigms should consider the advances
in other paradigms. Nevertheless, the security of
edge paradigms is still in its infancy; thus, there
are multiple open issues that merit consideration in
the near future.
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